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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
I.

COURT APPLIES STATE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION

ACT

In Newbeny PublishingCo. v. Newbeny County Commission on Alcohol
& Drug Abuse' the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the South
Carolina Law Enforcement Division's (SLED)2 policy of routinely denying
requests made pursuant to the South Carolina Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA)3 for criminal investigative reports violated that Act. 4 The court
found that materials that would otherwise be available to the public are not
exempt merely by their inclusion in a criminal investigative report. 5 Therefore, the court held that a criminal investigative report containing both exempt
and nonexempt material is subject to the statutory requirement that exempt
material be redacted and that nonexempt material be made available for public
inspection. 6
The Newberry Observer (Observer) initiated an action against the
Newberry County Commission on Alcohol and Drug Abuse (Commission)
when it refused to disclose a SLED report in its possession.' After SLED

1. - S.C. _, 417 S.E.2d 870 (1992).
2. "SLED was allowid to intervene to assert its interest in maintaining the confidentiality of
the criminal investigative report." Id. at _, 417 S.E.2d at 871. After SLED became a party,
the Newberry County Commission on Alcohol and Drug Abuse agreed to be bound by the court's
decision and was dismissed from the matter. Id. at _, 417 S.E.2d at 871 n.2.
3. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 30-4-10 to -110 (Law. Co-op. 1991 & Supp. 1992). For an overview
of the FOIA, see DAVID E. SHIPLEY, SOUTH CAROLINA ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ch. VIII, (2d ed.
1989). For a discussion of the development of state Freedom of Information laws, see Burt A.
Braverman & Wesley R. Heppler, A PracticalReview of State Open Records Laws, 49 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 720 (1981).
4. Newberry, _

S.C. at

_,

417 S.E.2d at 872.

5. Id.
6. Id. The South Carolina FOIA provides: "If any public record contains material which is
not exempt under subsection (a) of this section, the public body shall separate the exempt and
nonexempt material and make the nonexempt material available in accordance with the
requirements of this chapter." S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-40(b) (Law. Co-op. 1991), quoted in
Newberry, _
S.C. at _,
417 S.E.2d at 872.
7. Newberry, _ S.C. at _,
417 S.E.2d at 871.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1993

1

South
Carolina
Law Review,
45, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. [Vol.
3
SOUTH
CAROLINA
LAWVol.
REVIEW

45

intervened,8 the trial judge conducted an in camera review of the report and
ruled that it was entirely exempt from FOIA disclosure requirements. 9 The
South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling and ordered
SLED to make portions of the report available to the Observer."0
The FOIA provides an exemption from disclosure for records of law
enforcement agencies only under certain circumstances." However, SLED
routinely denied all FOIA requests for disclosure of material contained in
criminal investigative reports.' 2 The court held that SLED's policy contravened the FOIA because SLED never determined whether any parts of the
requested reports were subject to disclosure. 3 The court also noted that
SLED mistakenly relied on cases construing the more expansive Federal
Freedom of Information Act 4 because this case involved the South Carolina
FOIA.'
The court determined that the FOIA only exempts criminal investigative
reports from disclosure when "disclosure of the information would harm the
agency in one of four enumerated ways"' 6 or when another exemption found
in the FOIA 17 applies to the reports.' 8 The court concluded that documents
contained in the report, which would otherwise be public records, did not
become exempt by their incorporation into SLED's report. 19 Instead, it
ordered SLED to disclose "the Commission's bylaws and certificate of
incorporation, the audit performed on the Commission, and any accompanying
letters from the accountant."'2 The remainder of the SLED report contained

8. Id.; see supra note 2.
9.Newberry, _ at _, 417 S.E.2d at 871.
10. Id. at _, 417 S.E.2d at 872.
11. Section 30-4-40(a)(3) provides for the following exemption:
Records of law enforcement ... agencies ...that were compiled in the process of
detecting and investigating crime if the disclosure of the information would harm the
agency by: (A) Disclosing identity of informants not otherwise known; (B) The
premature release of information to be used in a prospective law enforcement action;
(C) Disclosing investigatory techniques not otherwise known outside the government;
(D) By endangering the life, health, or property of any person.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-40(a)(3) (Law. Co-op. 1991). The FOIA also exempts "[i]nformation
of a personal nature where the public disclosure thereof would constitute unreasonable invasion
of personal privacy." Id. § 30-4-40(a)(2).
,417 S.E.2d at 872.
12. Newberry, _ S.C. at
13. Id. at
,417 S.E.2d at 872.
14. The Federal FOIA is codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
15. Newberry, _ S.C. at _, 417 S.E.2d at 872 n.4.
16. Id. at
,417 S.E.2d at 872; see supra note 11.
17. For a complete list of exemptions found in the FOIA, see S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-440(a)
(Law. Co-op. 1991).
18. Newberry, _ S.C. at _, 417 S.E.2d at 872 n.5.
19. Id. at
,417 S.E.2d at 872.
20. Id.
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'
statements from confidential informants and a summary of their allegations.
22
disclosure.
from
exempt
portions
remaining
The court ruled these
Although the confidential informants' statements in this case were exempt
from disclosure, the court cautioned that this result may not be reached in all
cases.' The court noted that often the only applicable exemption will be the
one protecting the identity of informants.24 The court suggested that in many
cases, an agency could remove an informant's name and any identifying
The
information and then disclose the remainder of the information.'
agency must determine on a case-by-case basis which portions of such reports
should be removed and which portions should be disclosed.26
SLED argued that public policy supports nondisclosure of the reports
because of a potential chilling effect on informants if their identities are
disclosed.2 7 In support of this argument, SLED cited several federal and
state opinions2 as well as an opinion from the South Carolina Attorney
General which states: "The FOIA itself [reflects] recognition by the General
Assembly of the importance of maintaining confidentiality with respect to
criminal investigations."29 However, the court noted that the FOIA protects
confidentiality with the exemption for an informant's identity 0 and suggested
that it might be possible to remove the informant's name and identifying
information while still revealing the substance of any statements. 3 Indeed,

21. Id.
22. Id. at _, 417 S.E.2d at 872-73. The court concluded that these portions of the report
fell within one or more of the exemptions found in S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-40(a)(2)-(3) (Law.
Co-op. 1991), upon which the trial judge relied. Newberry,__ S.C. at _, 417 S.E.2d at 873
& n.6.
, 417 S.E.2d at 873.
23. Newberry, _ S.C. at
24. Id. at __, 417 S.E.2d at 873. This exemption is found in S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-440(a)(3)(A) (Law. Co-op. 1991).
25. Newberry, _ S.C. at _,
417 S.E.2d at 873. The court also noted that the FOIA
differs from the Federal Freedom of Information Act because the Federal Act protects the identity
417 S.E.2d at 873. But cf. Bellamy v. Brown, 305 S.C. 291, 408
of informants. Id. at _,
S.E.2d 219 (1991) (stating that the State FOIA and the Federal FOIA share essentially the same
purpose).
26. Newberry, _ S.C. at _, 417 S.E.2d at 873.
27. Brief of Respondent's at 7-9.
28. Id. Cases which SLED cited in support of its position in6lude: Irons v. FBI, 880 F.2d
1446 (1st Cir. 1989) (en banc); Cleary v. FBI, 811 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1987); King v. United
States Dep't of Justice, 830 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1987); L & C Marine Transp. Ltd. v. United
States, 740 F.2d 919 (llth Cir. 1984); Johnson v. United States Dep't of Justice, 739 F.2d 1514
(10th Cir. 1984); Iowa ex rel. v. Iowa Dist. Court, 356 N.W.2d 523 (Iowa 1984); Grodjesk v.
Faghani, 487 A.2d 759 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985), modified, 514 A.2d 1328 (N.J. 1986).
29. Brief of Respondent at 8 (alteration in original) (quoting 1989 Op. S.C. Att'y Gen. No.
89-78, at 207, abrogatedby United States Dep't of Justice v. Landano, 113 S. Ct. 2014 (1993)).
30. S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-40(a)(3)(A) (Law. Co-op. 1991).
31. Newberry PublishingCo. v. Newberry County Conm'n on Alcohol and DrugAbuse, __
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the court exempted from disclosure those portions of the report which were
given by confidential informants.32 The court noted South Carolina's
departure from the Federal FOIA on this point. 3
On the surface, this opinion seems to allow an interested party access to
public records34 even when exempt material is contained therein. However,
what happens when a public body turns over documents, pursuant to an FOIA
request, which are redacted to such an extent that the available portions are
useless? The requesting party should probably proceed as if the public body
had refused access to the entire record. South Carolina Code section 30-4100(a) allows any South Carolina citizen to apply to the circuit court for
enforcement of the FOIA provisions. 5 Thus, a party alleging that nonexempt
material was wrongfully withheld is not without a remedy. Additionally, as
an incentive to avoid willful violations, the FOIA awards attorney's fees to a
challenging party who prevails36 and holds willful violators of the FOIA
guilty of a misdemeanor.37
Another potential problem a party seeking access to public records may
encounter is that the public body in possession of the records may refuse to
release them by claiming that segregating exempt and nonexempt materials
would be too laborious or too expensive. The FOIA does not directly address
this situation, but seems to require that the public body redact the nonexempt

S.C.
, _,
417 S.E.2d 870, 873 (1992).
32. Id.at __, 417 S.E.2d at 872. Although the court does not specifically state the statutory
authority on which these exemptions are based, it does refer to S.C. CODE. ANN. § 30-440(a)(2)-(3) (Law. Co-op. 1991).
33. Newberry, _ S.C. at _, 417 S.E.2d at 873 ("Unlike the federal FOIA, our FOIA
protects only the identity of informants, not the information contained in their statements."). The
court also noted that the exemptions found in the Federal FOIA are more expansive than South
Carolina's exemptions. Id. at
, 417 S.E.2d at 872 n.4.
34. Neither party contested the document's status as a public record as defined by S.C. CODE
ANN. § 30-4-20(c) (La r. Co-op. 1991). Newberry, _ S.C. at _, 417 S.E.2d at 871 n.3.
35. South Carolina Code § 30-4-100(a) provides:
Any citizen of the State may apply to the circuit court for either or both a
declaratory judgement and injunctive relief to enforce the provisions of this chapter
in appropriate cases as long as such application is made no later than one year
following the date on which the alleged violation occurs or one year after a public
vote in session, whichever comes later.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-100(a) (Law. Co-op. 1991).
36. Id. § 30-4-100(b).
37. South Carolina Code § 30-4-110 provides:
Any person or group of persons who willfully violates the provisions of this
chapter shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be fined
not more than one hundred dollars or imprisoned for not more than thirty days for the
first offense, shall be fined not more than two hundred dollars or imprisoned for not
more than sixty days for the second offense and shall be fined three hundred dollars
or imprisoned for not more than ninety days for the third or subsequent offense.
Id. § 30-4-110.
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material, regardless of the time or expense involved.3" Furthermore, the
FOIA permits public bodies to "establish and collect fees not to exceed the
actual cost of searching for or making copies of records."" Thus, although
this situation has yet to be addressed by the South Carolina courts, it appears
that the General Assembly intended neither the labor or the cost involved with
segregating the documents to impede the public's right of access.
To reach a different conclusion 4 would be inconsistent with the purposes
of the FOIA.41 As evidenced by the Newbeny decision, the South Carolina
Supreme Court seems dedicated to accomplishing the stated objectives of the
South Carolina General Assembly.42
Arnold L. Ashley
II. SOUTH CAROLINA COURTS APPLY CONFLICTING STANDARDS OF
REVIEW OF COASTAL COUNCIL PERMITTING PROCEDURES

In 330 Concord Street Neighborhood Ass'n v. Campsen' the South
Carolina Court of Appeals applied the substantial evidence test to uphold the
South Carolina Coastal Council's issuance of a permit to build a restaurant.
The appeals court ruled that a public need for the restaurant existed, and this
need outweighed the negative environmental impact that the restaurant would

38. See id. § 30-4-40(b). ContraHines v. District of Columbia Bd. of Parole, 567 A.2d 909,
913 (D.C. 1989) (holding that a person seeking access to records pursuant to D.C.'s FOIA
"cannot simply ask for a mass of documents, many of which are incontrovertibly exempt from
production, and demand that the trial judge go through each document to determine if there is
some part of it to which [the party] may be entitled").
39. S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-30(b) (Law. Co-op. 1991).
40. E.g., Hines, 567 A.2d at 913-14.
41. The FOIA expresses the following purpose:
The General Assembly finds that it is vital to a democratic society that public
business be performed in an open and public manner so that citizens shall be advised
of the performance of public officials and of the decisions that are reached in public
activity and in the formulation of public policy. Toward this end, provisions of this
chapter must be construed so as to make it possible for citizens, or their representatives, to learn and report fully the activities of their public officials at a minimum cost
or delay to the persons seeking access to the public documents or meetings.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-15 (Law. Co-op. 1991).
42. See also Weston v. Carolina Research & Dev. Found., 303 S.C. 398, 401 S.E.2d 161
(1991) (holding that a non-profit eleemosynary corporation was a public body within the meaning
of the FOIA when it received and spent federal grant money); cf. Bellamy v. Brown, 305 S.C.
291, 295, 408 S.E.2d 219, 221 (1991) (stating that the "essential purpose of the FOIA is to
protect the public from secret government activity").
1. _

S.C.

_,

424 S.E.2d 538 (Ct. App. 1992).
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have on the mudflat areas of the Cooper River.2 On the same day that
Campsen was decided, the South Carolina Supreme Court, also using the
substantial evidence test, ruled that a public need did not exist for a marina in
Concerned Citizens Committee v. South Carolina Coastal Council.3 The
supreme court and the court of appeals applied conflicting standards of review
regarding the Coastal Council's issuance of permits. The two cases leave open
the issue of how much deference South Carolina courts will give to a state
agency's day-to-day decisions.
In Campsen the respondent, George Campsen, Jr., applied to the South
Carolina Coastal Council for a permit to build a 19,950 square foot restaurant
on the banks of Charleston Harbor as part of a joint project with the City of
Charleston and the National Park Service. Approximately 3,200 square feet
of the proposed restaurant would encroach upon the mudflat area. The
appellants, 330 Concord Street Neighborhood Association (the "Neighborhood"), argued that the restaurant's shading over the mudflat area would have
a negative environmental impact on the organisms requiring sunlight for
photosynthesis. Campsen argued that the vitality of the entire project
depended upon the restaurant and no feasible alternatives existed.4
After reviewing Campsen's application, the Coastal Council issued a
permit to build the restaurant in the area's critical zone.5 On appeal the
circuit court agreed with the Coastal Council's decision holding that substantial
evidence supported the Council's decision and that the Coastal Council had not
abused its discretion; the court of appeals affirmed.6
In Concerned Citizens the respondent, D & D Enterprises (D & D),
received a permit from the South Carolina Coastal Council to build a sixty slip
marina on the Ashley River in North Charleston.7 The appellants, Concerned
Citizens Committee for the Ashley River ("Concerned Citizens'!), argued that
the Coastal Council violated its own regulations by issuing the permit. The
Coastal Council's Permitting Committee issued the permit, and Concerned
Citizens appealed to the hearing officer.8 The Full Coastal Council approved
the issuance of the permit, and on appeal the circuit court affirmed, finding
that substantial evidence supported the Council's decision. The supreme court
then reversed the circuit court.9
The courts in both cases demonstrated differing degrees of judicial
intervention and review over the Coastal Council's permitting process.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at __, 424 S.E.2d at 540-41.
__ S.C.
, 423 S.E.2d 134 (1992).
Campsen, - S.C. at _, 424 S.E.2d at 539.
Id. at __,424 S.E.2d at 539.
Id. at
424 S.E.2d at 539.
ConcernedCitizens, _ S.C. at
, 423 S.E.2d at 135.
Id. at
423 S.E.2d at 137.
Id. at
423 S.E.2d at 135.
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However, both the Concerned Citizens and the Campsen courts applied the
substantial evidence test.10 The South Carolina Supreme Court outlined the
substantial evidence test in Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc.:" "[T]he court on review [is
empowered] to reverse or modify the decision 'if substantial rights of the
appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences,
conclusions or decisions are: (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,
probative and substantial evidence on the whole record.'"12 The Campsen
court based its standard of review on whether substantial evidence existed to
reverse the Council's finding that the proposed restaurant, as a "nonwaterdependent" structure, 3 met all of the criteria necessary to fall within the
regulatory exception. 4 This exception allows for placement of nonwaterdependent structures within a critical zone only if there is (1) no significant
environmental impact, (2) an overriding public need for the structure, and (3)
no feasible alternative.' 5 The Campsen court addressed each criterion
evidence supported the Council's
separately to determine whether substantial
6
finding that the criteria had been met.'
The Campsen court found that substantial evidence supported the finding
that the restaurant would not cause a significant environmental impact, thereby
satisfying the first criterion of the regulatory exception.' 7 Even though the
Neighborhood presented evidence to the contrary, the court noted that "the
possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not
prevent the agency's decision from being supported by substantial evidence."'" In Lark the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that although the
substantial evidence test allows the court more deference when reviewing an
agency's decision, the test "'need not and must not be either judicial factfinding or a substitution of judicial judgment for agency judgment.'""'
Accordingly, the Campsen court reasoned that conflicting evidence does not

10. Id. at _, 423 S.E.2d at 135; Campsen, _

S.C. at __, 424 S.E.2d at 539.

11. 276 S.C. 130, 276 S.E.2d 304 (1981).
12. Id. at 135, 276 S.E.2d at 306 (quoting S.C.

CODE ANN.

§ 1-23-380(g) (Law. Co-op.

1986)).
13. A "nonwater-dependent" structure is "afacility which cannot demonstrate that dependence
on, use of, or access to coastal waters is vital to the functioning of its primary activity." S.C.
CODE REGS. 30-1(C)(9) (Supp. 1992).
14. Campsen, _ S.C. at _, 424 S.E.2d at 539.
15. S.C. CODE REGS. 30-12(M) (1976).
16. Campsen, _ S.C. at _, 424 S.E.2d at 539.
17. Id. at _, 424 S.E.2d at 539-40; see S.C. CODE REGS. 30-12 (M)(1976).
18. Id. at_, 424 S.E.2d at 540 (citing Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 276 S.E.2d 304
(1981)).
19. Lark, 276 S.C. at 136, 276 S.E.2d at 307 (quoting Dickinson-Tidewater, Inc. v.
Supervisor of Assessments, 329 A.2d 18 (Md. 1974)).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1993

7

South
Carolina
Law Review,
45, Iss. 1 [1993], Art.[Vol.
3
45
SOUTH
CAROLINA
LAW Vol.
REVIEW

bar a finding that the Coastal Council's decision was supported by substantial
evidence.2
The Campsen court further found that an overriding public need existed
for the proposed structure; consequently, this finding satisfied the second
criterion of the regulatory exception. 2' The court recognized that "[t]he term
'overriding public need' is not defined in Coastal Council's statutes and
regulations."' Again the court looked to testimony and exhibits presented
at the hearing to decide that substantial evidence existed to establish a public
need for the restaurant.' The court rejected the Neighborhood's argument
that the Council erred in analyzing the evidence subjectively instead of
objectively, stating "We note the appellants' last argument seems to confuse
evidence and analysis. The objective evidence in the case was the testimony
and exhibits. However, the agency is required to exercise discretion in
making its decision on the permit. In doing so, it must necessarily make a
subjective judgment."24
In considering whether an overriding public need existed, the Campsen
court discussed South CarolinaWildlife Federationv. South Carolina Coastal
Council,' which established that "evidence of purely economic benefit is
insufficient as a matter of law to establish an overriding public interest. "26
However, the court factually distinguished South CarolinaWildlife Federation
from the instant case. In South Carolina Wildlife Federation the proposed
waterfront residential lots generated only an economic benefit for the local tax
base and the local job market;27 whereas in Campsen the proposed development would produce more than purely economic benefits because "[t]he
museum and tour boat facility will provide educational and recreational
benefits to the public as well as an economic benefit to the community." 28
Finally, the Campsen court held that substantial evidence supported the
Coastal Council's finding that no feasible alternatives existed, the third
criterion of the regulatory exception.29 Campsen presented testimony of
20. Canpsen, _ S.C. at _,
424 S.E.2d at 540.
21. Id. at _,
424 S.E.2d at 540-41; S.C. CODE REGS. 30-12(M) (1976).
22. Canpsen, _ S.C. at _,
424 S.E.2d at 540.

23. Id. at _, 424 S.E.2d at 540. The decision focused on the testimony of several witnesses
who stated that the restaurant was an integral part of the three phase development consisting of
the aquatic science museum, tour boat facility, and restaurant. [Tihe witnesses stated the
restaurant would provide a needed food service to the public. No other restaurant was within
walking distance and the witnesses testified their expectation was that people would spend several
hours visiting the museum and taking the boat tour. Id.
24. Id. at _, 424 S.E.2d at 540.
25. 296 S.C. 187, 371 S.E.2d 521 (1988).
26. Id. at 190, 371 S.E.2d at 523.
27. Id. at 190, 371 S.E.2d at 522-23.
28. Canipsen, _ S.C. at _, 424 S.E.2d at 541.
29. Id. at_,
424 S.E.2d at 541; see S.C. CODE REGS. 30-12 (M) (1976).
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several experts involved in the project regarding the necessity of building in
the critical zone." The Neighbors contended that the testimony was only
opinion and lacked probative value.3 In rejecting the Neighbors' argument,
the court concluded, "Given our standard of review, we find no error since the
conclusion reached by Coastal Council based upon the record before it is one
a reasonable mind might have reached."32
The Concerned Citizens court resolved whether substantial evidence
existed to support the Council's decision that a "public demand" for the
marina existed. After reviewing the testimony, the supreme court concluded
that D & D showed only "a conjecture that the need will, in the future, be
established." 3 3 The court noted that the second criterion of the regulatory
exception, public need, requires proof of a present need or demand for the
marina.34
Therefore, the supreme court reversed the Coastal Council's
decision and revoked D & D's permit because "[tihe fact that the marina may
create a demand for wet moorage does not satisfy the requirement of need.""
Campsen and Concerned Citizens raise issues concerning the degree to
which South Carolina courts will apply the substantial evidence test and at
what level the determination of "public need" should be made. The cases
represent opposite ends of the spectrum. In Campsen the court of appeals
applied the substantial evidence test strictly and limited its review; whereas,
in Concerned Citizens the supreme court acted as a finder of fact. This
conflict breeds confusion and uncertainty among practitioners and state
agencies.
The South Carolina Code clearly outlines as follows the extent to which
a court, acting in its appellate capacity, should review a state agency's
decision:
The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to
the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.... The court may
reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have
been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial
evidence on the whole record ....36

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Campsen, _ S.C. at __, 424 S.E.2d at 541.
Id. at_, 424 S.E.2d at 541.
Id. at _, 424 S.E.2d at 541.
Concerned Citizens, __ S.C. at _, 423 S.E.2d at 136.
Id. at_, 423 S.E.2d at 136; see S.C. CODE REGS. 30-12(M) (1976).
Concerned Citizens, __ S.C. at __, 423 S.E.2d at 136.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-380(g) (Law. Co-op. 1986).
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Traditionally, the South Carolina Supreme Court adhered strictly to the Code
in reviewing state agency decisions. Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc. 37 is the leading case
illustrating the court's application of the substantial evidence test. There, the
supreme court interpreted the substantial evidence test as a protection for
agencies against subjective judicial interference in their daily decision-making
processes as it stated the following:
We, therefore, caution the Bench and Bar as to the limitations upon the
application of the "substantial evidence" rule in reviewing the decision[s]
of administrative agencies. As stated in Dickinson-Tidewater, Inc. v.
Supervisor of Assess[ments], the substantial evidence test "need not and
must not be either judicial fact-finding or a substitution of judicial
judgment for agency judgment;" and a judgment upon which reasonable
men might differ will not be set aside.38
The supreme court repeatedly referred to Lark in several recent cases.
In Hamm v. South CarolinaPublic Service Commission 9 the Public Service
Commission ("PSC") granted Wild Dunes Utilities, Inc. ("Wild Dunes") an
increase in water and sewage utility rates. Hamm, a consumer advocate,
appealed the PSC's order, claiming that Wild Dunes failed to produce
sufficient evidence to support such an increase.4" The court held that "Itihe
PSC's order is presumed to be valid and reasonable, and it has the force and
effect of law. This Court is precluded from substituting its judgment for that
of the PSC upon a question as to which there is room for a difference of
intelligent opinion." 41 In Roper Hospital v. Board of South Carolina
DHEC,42 the agency appealed the circuit court's reversal of its order denying
Roper Hospital's application for a certificate of need to construct a new
hospital.43 The court held that DHEC's "findings are adequately supported
by evidence in the record, including testimony of the DHEC staff and other
witnesses. Albeit there is evidence contrary to the findings made by the
Board, under Lark... the Board's findings are conclusive when supported by
substantial evidence."' Therefore, the supreme court reversed the circuit
court and reinstated DHEC's order of denial.45

37.
38.
text.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

276 S.C. 130, 276 S.E.2d 304 (1981).
Id. at 136, 276 S.E.2d at 307 (citation omitted); see supranotes 11-19 and accompanying
S.C. _, 422 S.E.2d 118 (1992).
Id. at_, 422 S.E.2d at 119.
Id. at _, 422 S.E.2d at 120.
306 S.C. 138, 410 S.E.2d 558 (1991).
Id. at 139-40, 410 S.E.2d at 559.
Id. at 141, 410 S.E.2d at 560 (footnote omitted).
__

45. Id.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss1/3

10

et al.: Administrative
Law
LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE

1993]

The Lark, Roper Hospital, and Hamm decisions establish a sound and
consistent line of reasoning. However, the Concerned Citizens decision
departs from that line of cases insofar as it requires more evidence in the
record to satisfy the substantial evidence test. Even though the evidence
presented in Concerned Citizens appears as substantial as that presented in
Lark, Roper Hospital, and Hamm, the Concerned Citizens court found the
46
evidence insufficient to support the Coastal Council's issuance of a permit.
Justice Harwell's dissent in Concerned Citizens outlined some of the evidence
relied upon by the Coastal Council in finding a demand existed for a marina
as follows:
In its marina permit application submitted to Coastal Council, D & D
specifically stated that "the existing marina capacities are insufficient (as
well as inefficient) to meet the current demand."
As the majority notes, Stephen Moore, Coastal Council's permit
administrator, also testified regarding the demand for the marina....
Moore's testimony that marinas fill up quickly, along with his testimony
that he knew of two marinas with waiting lists of over 200 people,
definitively demonstrates demand for the marina. 47
Although this evidence does not mandate a finding of "need" for a marina, it
does create a question upon which reasonable persons may differ. 4' Therefore,
the supreme court arguably exceeded the scope of review it established in
Lark. 9 Conversely, the court of appeals in Campsen paid greater heed to the
past decisions of the supreme court by not substituting its own judgment for
that of the agency.5 0
Besides the difference between Campsen and ConcernedCitizens involving
the standard of review, another interesting difference may prove important.
While addressing the public need requirement to issue permits, Campsen refers
to "public need"5" while Concerned Citizens refers to "public demand." 52
Both cases cite South CarolinaWildlife Federation v. South CarolinaCoastal

46. Concerned Citizens,

__

S.C. at

_,

423 S.E.2d at 138 (1992) (Harwell, C.J.,

dissenting).
47. Id. at __, 423 S.E.2d at 138 (Harwell, C.J., dissenting).
48. See Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 136, 276 S.E.2d 304, 307 (1981) (holding that
"a judgment upon which reasonable men might differ will not be set aside").
49. See supranotes 11-19 and accompanying text.
50. Campsen, _ S.C. at
, 424 S.E.2d at 541 (Ct. App. 1992); see supra notes 22-24 and
accompanying text.
51. Campsen, _

S.C. at _,

424 S.E.2d at 540-41.

52. Concerned Citizens Comm. v. South Carolina Coastal Council
S.E.2d 134, 136-37 (1992).
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CounciP 3 as persuasive in determining whether need exists. However, South
Carolina Wildlife Federation discusses "public interest" in determining
whether to support the issuance of a permit. 4 A review of these three cases
requires inquiry into whether demand, need, and interest involve the same
standard. If so, why are the benefits of a restaurant any less economically
driven than supplying a marina in an area with a shortage of boat slips?
Arguably, situations may arise where a "demand" but no "need" exists, or
where an "interest" but no "demand" exists. The standard appears very
arbitrary. The evidence of "need" or "demand" does not seem any more
persuasive in Campsen than it did in Concerned Citizens. The only difference
lies in the degree of deference the two courts afforded the Coastal Council.
If "need" is so arbitrary, then one can reasonably conclude that the finder of
fact, who has the opportunity to weigh all the evidence and testimony first
hand, is in the best position to determine what the public needs or demands.
The scopes of review that the court of appeals and the supreme court
followed in Campsen and Concerned Citizens differed significantly and will
leave administrative agencies uncertain as to their appropriate roles. The court
of appeals' holding in Campsen-thatthe Coastal Council's decision will stand
because it was reasonable and based on substantial evidence-seems to
contradict the supreme court's holding in Concerned Citizens. The supreme
court apparently required more evidence to satisfy the substantial evidence test
than the court of appeals did. The Lark line of cases clearly established that
whether substantial evidence exists to support an agency's decision is answered
on a "reasonable person" standard of review. However, in ConcernedCitizens
the supreme court replaces this standard with its own view of reasonableness.
Justice Harwell's dissent in Concerned Citizens followed the court's traditional
application of the substantial evidence test and reminded the majority that "this
Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight
of the evidence on questions of fact."'
Ralph W. Barbier, III

53. 296 S.C. 187, 371 S.E.2d 521 (1988).
54. Id. at 190, 371 S.E.2d at 522-23 (holding that "evidence of purely economic benefit is
insufficient as a matter of law to establish an overriding public interest").
,423 S.E.2d at 139 (Harvell, C.J., dissenting) (citing
55. ConcernedCitizens, - S.C. at
S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-380(g) (Law. Co-op. 1986)).
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